Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81106
Authors: 
Sass, Linda
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Center of Mathematical Economics 478
Abstract: 
Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.
Subjects: 
knightian uncertainty in games
objective ambiguity
strategic ambiguity
extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's theorem
rectangularity
JEL: 
C72
C73
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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