Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Riedel, Frank
Sass, Linda
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics 452
Ambiguity can be used as a strategic device in some situations. To demonstrate this, we propose and study a framework for normal form games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In such Ellsberg games, players may use Ellsberg urns in addition to the standard objective mixed strategies. We assume that players are ambiguity-averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler. While classical Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the new game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria that can be quite different from Nash equilibria. A negotiation game with three players illustrates this finding. Another class of examples shows the use of ambiguity in mediation. We also highlight some conceptually interesting properties of Ellsberg equilibria in two person games with conflicting interests.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
365.14 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.