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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 451
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspondence we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically stable face (MASF) if it is asymptotically stable under some such dynamics and no subface of it is asymptotically stable under any such dynamics. The set of such correspondences (and dynamics) is endowed with the partial order of point-wise set-inclusion and, under a mild condition on the normal form of the game at hand, forms a complete lattice with meets based on point-wise intersections. The refined best reply correspondence is then defined as the smallest element of the set of all generalized best reply correspondences. We ultimately find that every Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retract, which coincide with Basu and Weibull's (1991) CURB sets based, however, on the refined best reply correspondence, contains a MASF. Conversely, every MASF must be a Voorneveld's (2004) prep set, again, however, based on the refined best reply correspondence.
Schlagwörter: 
Evolutionary game theory
best response dynamics
CURB sets
persistent retracts
asymptotic stability
Nash equilibrium refinements
learning
JEL: 
C62
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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