Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81075 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2012/97
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a theory of political clientelism, which explains sources and determinants of political clientelism, the relationship between clientelism and elite capture, and their respective consequences for allocation of public services, welfare, and empirical measurement of government accountability in service delivery. Using data from household surveys in rural West Bengal, we argue that the model helps explain observed impacts of political reservations in local governments that are difficult to reconcile with standard models of redistributive politics.
Schlagwörter: 
clientelism
elite capture
service delivery
government accountability
corruption, political reservations
JEL: 
H11
H42
H76
O23
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-561-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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