Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81075
Authors: 
Bardhan, Pranab
Mookherjee, Dilip
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2012/97
Abstract: 
We provide a theory of political clientelism, which explains sources and determinants of political clientelism, the relationship between clientelism and elite capture, and their respective consequences for allocation of public services, welfare, and empirical measurement of government accountability in service delivery. Using data from household surveys in rural West Bengal, we argue that the model helps explain observed impacts of political reservations in local governments that are difficult to reconcile with standard models of redistributive politics.
Subjects: 
clientelism
elite capture
service delivery
government accountability
corruption, political reservations
JEL: 
H11
H42
H76
O23
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-561-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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