Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80936
Authors: 
Castilla, Carolina
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2013/007
Abstract: 
I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband's own reporting of farm sales and the wife's reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the allocation of resources is consistent with hiding. Findings indicate that allocations are suggestive of men hiding farm sales income in the form of gifts to extended family members.
Subjects: 
incomplete information
income-hiding
non-cooperative family bargaining
JEL: 
D13
D82
J12
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-584-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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