Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80725
Authors: 
Jovanovic, Dragan
Wey, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 102
Abstract: 
We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing PPOs when evaluating merger proposals (which reflects the current EU merger control regime) invites sneaky takeovers: Acquiring firms strategically use PPOs prior to a full merger proposal to get mergers approved which are, in fact, detrimental to consumers.
Subjects: 
Horizontal Mergers
(Passive) Partial Ownership
Antitrust
Synergies
Sneaky Takeovers
JEL: 
D43
K21
L13
L41
ISBN: 
978-386-30410-1-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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