Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80665
Authors: 
Lacomba, Juan Antonio
Lagos, Francisco
Reuben, Ernesto
van Winden, Frans A. A. M.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7492
Abstract: 
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents.
Subjects: 
conflict
rent-seeking
appropriation
peace
escalation
tournaments
contests
JEL: 
C92
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
408.32 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.