Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80570 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7363
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
altruism
spite
incentives
relational contracts
efficiency wages
subjective performance evaluation
Nash bargaining
JEL: 
D23
J33
M52
M55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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