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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2005-01
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting.
Schlagwörter: 
Core
Incomplete Information
Coalitional Voting
Resilience
Mediation
JEL: 
C71
C72
D51
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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