Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80212
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2005-01
Abstract: 
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting.
Subjects: 
Core
Incomplete Information
Coalitional Voting
Resilience
Mediation
JEL: 
C71
C72
D51
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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