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de Clippel, Geoffroy
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2004-18
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)’s coarse core. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson’s fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.
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Working Paper

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