Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80201
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2007-11
Abstract: 
This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.
Subjects: 
game theory
cooperative game
characteristic function
solution concept
core
Shapley value
axiomatics
equivalence principle
non-cooperative implementation
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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