Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80189
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Shimomura, Ken-ichi
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2001-30
Abstract: 
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the kooperative analysis, we characterize the average prekernel as the unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and versions of average consistency and its converse for multilateral settings.
Subjects: 
average prekernel
prekernel
Nash set
Nash program
bargaining
consistency
average consistency
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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