Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80183
Authors: 
De Clippel, Geoffroy
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2005-11
Abstract: 
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two-stage process of coalition formation in whose second stage our axiomatic results are applied. We find reasons to explain inefficient coalition structures, and provide sufficient conditions for efficiency. – externalities ; marginal contributions ; Shapley value ; Pigouvian transfers ; coalition formation
JEL: 
C7
D62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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