Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80165
Authors: 
Artemov, Georgy
Kunimoto, Takashi
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2007-06
Abstract: 
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents’ payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes our reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine, allows us to obtain very permissive results. Our first result is that generically, if there are at least three alternatives, any incentive compatible social choice function is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. Further, we characterize robust virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by means of incentive compatibility and measurability. Our characterization is independent of the presence of monetary transfers or assumptions alike, made in previous studies. Our work also clarifies the measurability condition in connection to the generic diversity of preferences used in our first result.
Subjects: 
Wilson doctrine
mechanism design
robust virtual implementation
iteratively undominated strategies
incentive compatibility
measurability
type diversity
JEL: 
C72
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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