Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80162
Authors: 
Dutta, Bhaskar
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2001-02
Abstract: 
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary information sharing, respectively. We propose a newcore notion, the credible core, which incorporates incentive compatibility constraints, and is based on the idea that a coalition can coordinate its potential objection to a status-quo over an event that can be credibly inferred from the nature of the objection being contemplated.
Subjects: 
Core
Asymmetric Information
Incentive Compatibility
Credibility
Durability
JEL: 
C71
D82
D51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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