Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80142
Authors: 
Cinyabuguma, Matthias
Page, Talbot
Putterman, Louis
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2004-05
Abstract: 
In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a noexpulsion baseline. Expulsions were strictly of the lowest contributors, and there was an exceptionally strong fall-off in contributions in the last period, when the expulsion threat was unavailable. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is one device that helps groups to provide public goods.
Subjects: 
Public goods
collective action
punishment
JEL: 
C91
H41
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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