Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80136
Authors: 
Kar, Anirban
Ray, Indrajit
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2005-10
Abstract: 
We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Correlated Equilibrium Distribution
Implementation
Monotonicity
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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