Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80135
Authors: 
Dutta, Bhaskar
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2003-21
Abstract: 
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary information sharing, respectively. We propose a new core notion, the credible core, which incorporates incentive compatibility constraints, and is based on the idea that a coalition can coordinate its potential objection to a status-quo over an event that can be credibly inferred from the nature of the objection being contemplated. We provide sufficient conditions ensuring non-emptiness of the credible core. – Core ; Asymmetric Information ; Incentive Compatibility ; Credibility
JEL: 
C71
D82
D51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
152.48 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.