Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80126
Authors: 
Ben-Ner, Avner
Putterman, Louis
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2006-23
Abstract: 
We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor “fair and efficient” proposals over the unequal proposals predicted by theory.
Subjects: 
trust game
trust
trustworthiness
reciprocity
Commitment
communication
JEL: 
C72
C91
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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