Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80100
Authors: 
Forges, Françoise
Minelli, Enrico
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2000-22
Abstract: 
This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.
Subjects: 
Core
Asymmetric information
Incentive compatibility
Exchange economy
JEL: 
C71
D82
D51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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