Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80095 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2002-11
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).
Schlagwörter: 
Virtual monotonicity
Bayesian monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity
virtual Bayesian implementation
incentive compatibility
type diversity
JEL: 
C72
D78
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
175.41 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.