Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80095
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2002-11
Abstract: 
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).
Subjects: 
Virtual monotonicity
Bayesian monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity
virtual Bayesian implementation
incentive compatibility
type diversity
JEL: 
C72
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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