Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80092
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2004-03
Abstract: 
Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not constitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renegotiation and with ex-post renegotiation. Moreover, taking a full implementation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints identified by Maskin and Moore, because of the appearance of undesirable equilibria. – contracts ; renegotiation ; mechanism design
JEL: 
C70
D74
K10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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