Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80090
Authors: 
Kolmar, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2002-05
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze the optimal interplay between the publie and private enforceement of property rights. In doing so we endogenize the distinction between public and club goods on the one and private and common-pool goods on the other hand. The private enforcement of property rights is seen as a substitute for public enforcement that results in a contest between the private defender of its property and the potential appropriator. Public enforcement changes the opportunity costs in this contest. We characterize how optimality conditions for the provision of private and public goods change, how an optimal enforcement policy looks like, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives.
Subjects: 
Private Goods
Public Goods
Club Goods
Common-Pool Goods
Private Enforcement
Public Enforcement
Contest
JEL: 
D74
H41
H42
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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