Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80012
Authors: 
Riedel, Frank
Sass, Linda
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Game Theory E15-V3
Abstract: 
In classic game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices as strategies and study the consequences for the basic results of normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. These equilibria turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play.
JEL: 
C72
D81
C70
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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