Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79952
Authors: 
Köke, Sonja
Lange, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Climate Policy III E04-V2
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze how rati cation uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the rati cation stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the pivotal voter). With this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the one on two-level games of rati cation. We nd that rati cation uncertainty reduces both the strength of the commitment as well as the participation threshold, thereby a ecting intensive as well as extensive margins of expected international cooperation. Similar comparative statics arise under uncertainty when pivotal voters' and negotiators' preferences diverge. This is a rst step towards linking individual voters' preferences to the outcome of IEAs.
JEL: 
Q54
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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