Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79951
Authors: 
Koehne, Sebastian
Kuhn, Moritz
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Incentives B15-V1
Abstract: 
We study optimal capital taxation in a dynamic Mirrleesian model with time-nonseparable preferences. The model covers the widely used cases of habit formation and durable consumption. Time-nonseparable preferences change labor supply incentives across time and thereby generate novel motives to distort capital accumulation decisions. We decompose intertemporal wedges (implicit capital taxes) into three components and provide conditions under which intertemporal wedges are positive. We derive a recursive formulation of constrained efficient allocations and evaluate the quantitative importance of habit formation for intertemporal wedges. In our baseline parameterization, habit formation reduces average intertemporal wedges by about 40 percent compared to the time-separable case.
JEL: 
D82
E21
H21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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