Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79948
Authors: 
Steg, Jan-Henrik
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Dynamic Models of Duopoly and Labor Markets A17-V2
Abstract: 
We present a duopoly model of strategic capital accumulation in continuous time with uncertainty, such that investment takes the form of singular control. Spot competition is of Cournot type. For this model there exists a parameterized and Pareto-rankable family of Markov perfect equiblibria in symmetric strategies, according to which implicit collusion induces positive option values. However, preemption can also eliminate any option value in a limiting case corresponding to Bertrand prices.
JEL: 
C73
D43
D92
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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