Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79940
Authors: 
Markwardt, Gunther
Farzanegan, Mohammad
Leßmann, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Environment, Regions, and Innovation B04-V1
Abstract: 
We study how natural-resource rents a ffect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive e ffect of the natural-resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data covering the period 1984{2004 from more than 90 countries, we find evidence that natural-resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is signi cantly mitigated by decentralization.
JEL: 
Q34
H77
P28
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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