Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79931
Authors: 
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Ansink, Erik
Gengenbach, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Game Theory E15-V2
Abstract: 
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.
JEL: 
C79
D71
P14
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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