Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79930
Authors: 
Seel, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Auctions and Contests G16-V1
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions over head starts. In equilibrium, the stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. This result introduces a new perspective on lobbying contests and procurement contests.
JEL: 
C72
C73
D72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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