Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79905 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Competition Policy No. C13-V3
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
We estimate the spillovers on firm profitability and market shares in oligopolistic markets through the transition from an n to an n-1 player oligopoly after a merger in the industry. Competitors are identified via the European Commission s market investigations and our methodology allows us to disentangle the spillover due to the change in market structure from the merger effect. We obtain results consistent with the predictions of standard oligopoly models: non-merging rivals expand their output and increase their profits, while merging firms barely break even. The size of the effect is larger in industries with fewer oligopolists and higher initial profits.
JEL: 
L13
L40
G34
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.