Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Stiebale, Joel
Haucap, Justus
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Empirics: Markets and Media F13-V2
This papers analyses how horizontal mergers affect innovation activities of the merged entity and its non-merging competitors. We develop an oligopoly model with heterogeneous firms to derive empirically testable implications. Our model predicts that a merger is more likely to be profitable in an innovation intensive industry. For a high degree of firm heterogeneity a merger reduces innovation in both the merged entity and in non-merging competitors in an industry with high R\&D intensity. Using data on horizontal mergers among pharmaceutical firms in Europe, we find that our econometric results are consistent with many predictions of the theoretical model. Our main result is that after a merger patenting and R\&D of the merged entity and its non-merging rivals declines substantially. The results are robust towards alternative specifications and using an instrumental variable strategy.
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.