Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79822
Authors: 
Staudigl, Mathias
Weidenholzer, Simon
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Evolution of Networks and Games F22-V
Abstract: 
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We fi nd that a payo ff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that under constrained interactions agents face a trade-off between the links they have and those they would rather have.
JEL: 
C73
C72
D85
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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