Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79810
Authors: 
Brünner, Tobias
Becker, Alice
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Auctions and Licensing F16-V2
Abstract: 
In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we fi nd many occurrences of the winner's curse under the first-price rule but only few occurrences under the second-price rule. Moreover, bidding behavior is very heterogeneous across subjects. A considerable share of our subjects anticipates that other bidders overbid and respond by bidding lower than in equilibrium. We fi nd that the level-k model performs well in explaining our results.
JEL: 
D44
C91
D03
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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