Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79800
Authors: 
Sieg, Gernot
Rothbauer, Jula
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Media und Platform Competition G13-V3
Abstract: 
A welfare-maximizing Public Service Broadcaster (PSB) broadcasts both information-type and show-type content if (i) the information consumption of TV viewers generates external benefits for society by improving the ability of voters to control politicians and (ii) the marginal external benefits of information consumption diminish as the information possessed by voters increases. We analyze a two-sided free-to-air TV market with two differentiated private channels and a commercial-free PSB. Welfare depends on the efficiency of the PSB, the external benefits of voter information, and lost rents from the advertising market. Welfare can be higher without a PSB.
JEL: 
L82
D72
L32
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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