Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79773
Authors: 
Watzinger, Martin
Seitz, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: R&D and Innovation II C10-V1
Abstract: 
In this article we study the relation between the quality of contract enforcement and R&D investment across countries and industries. If companies invest successfully in R&D they are open for exploitation by their supplier if supply contracts are not enforceable. This hold-up problem can reduce the incentive to invest in R&D exante. In line with this theoretical idea we find in the empirical analysis that R&D investment increases with the quality of the judicial system. This effect is particularly strong in industries which rely more on contracts to acquire input and in which it is harder to vertically integrate.
JEL: 
O30
O43
P48
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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