Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79765
Authors: 
Kislat, Carmen
Menkhoff, Lukas
Neuberger, Doris
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Financial Frictions and Business Cycles F02-V3
Abstract: 
The ex ante theory of collateral states that better informed lenders, such as informal lenders, rely less on collateral. We test this by contrasting the use of collateral between formal and informal lenders in the same market. Indeed, formal lenders rely more often on collateral, controlling for conventional determinants of collateral. Moreover, better information about borrowers has implications within lender groups: first, relationship lending reduces asymmetric information, but only for formal lenders who use collateral less with longer relationship; second, short distance between lender and borrower reduces asymmetric information, mainly for informal lenders who use collateral less at shorter distances.
JEL: 
O16
O17
G21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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