Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79746 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Behavioral Economics, Underlying Principles No. D05-V2
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
We consider the interaction of intrinsic motivation and concerns for social approval in a laboratory experiment. We elicit a proxy for Fairtrade preferences before the experiment. In the experiment, we elicit willingness to pay for conventional and Fairtrade chocolate. Treatments vary whether this can be signalled to other participants. Subjects concerned with social approval should state a higher Fairtrade premium when signalling is possible. We find that this is the case, but interestingly only for participants who are not intrinsically motivated to buy Fairtrade. This has important implications both for crowding out of intrinsic motivation through incentives and for producer choices.
JEL: 
D03
C91
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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