Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79722
Authors: 
Klingelhöfer, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Lobbying and Elections D03-V3
Abstract: 
In using their citizen candidate framework, Besley and Coate (2001) fi nd that if citizen candidates with sufficiently extreme preferences are available, lobbying has no in fluence on equilibrium policy. I show that this result does not hold in a model with ideological parties instead of citizen candidates. Even if forward-looking voters are aware that lobbying will take place, their choice between policies is di erent when lobbies do and do not exist. In many cases, the majority of voters is better off with lobbying.
JEL: 
D72
D70
C72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.