Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79719
Authors: 
Peters, Wolfgang
Heuson, Clemens
Schwarze, Reimund
Topp, Anna-Katharina
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Climate Policy III E04-V3
Abstract: 
The strategy of adaptation to climate change has become a central topic within the UNFCCC negotiations in recent years. On the national level, adaptation plans are elaborated, and on the international level, the need for funding adaptation in developing countries is discussed. This tendency shows that adaptation is likely to be advanced relative to mitigation on the political agenda. Therefore, we analyze the economic consequences of the timing of mitigation and adaptation in a game-theoretic framework regarding as well the importance of technological investments for mitigation. Due to strategic behavior, the activity in mitigation deteriorates when adaptation is advanced. As a consequence, the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium yields higher total costs. We demonstrate that this result is even reinforced when technological investments are regarded, i.e. the negative effects of advancing adaptation relative to the opposite timing are amplified.
JEL: 
Q54
H87
C72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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