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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 13-2
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also provided an epistemic characterization in terms of the notion of common belief in future rationality. The epistemic characterization we propose, although differently formulated, is conceptually the same as Perea's and so is the generalization of backward induction. The novelty of this contribution lies in the epistemic models that we use, which are dynamic, behavioral models where strategies play no role and the only beliefs that are specified are the actual beliefs of the players at the time of choice. Thus our analysis is free of (objective or subjective) counterfactuals.
Schlagwörter: 
dynamic game
imperfect information
backward induction
belief
rationality
behavioral model
JEL: 
C7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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