Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79676
Authors: 
Bonanno, Giacomo
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 13-2
Abstract: 
We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also provided an epistemic characterization in terms of the notion of common belief in future rationality. The epistemic characterization we propose, although differently formulated, is conceptually the same as Perea's and so is the generalization of backward induction. The novelty of this contribution lies in the epistemic models that we use, which are dynamic, behavioral models where strategies play no role and the only beliefs that are specified are the actual beliefs of the players at the time of choice. Thus our analysis is free of (objective or subjective) counterfactuals.
Subjects: 
dynamic game
imperfect information
backward induction
belief
rationality
behavioral model
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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