Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79647
Authors: 
Koenen, Johannes
Peitz, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4355
Abstract: 
In this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation to only apply for a patent whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential rents from PTO mistakes in granting patents. We provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist. In particular, we analyze the merits of different patent systems.
Subjects: 
pending patents
reputation
patent quality
patent office policy
JEL: 
L15
L22
O34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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