Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79607 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2012-058
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the design of a leniency policy to fight corporate crime. We explicitly take into account the agency problem within the firm. We model this through a three-tier hierarchy: authority, shareholder, and manager. The manager may breach the law and report evidence to the authority. The shareholder writes the manager's incentive scheme, monitors him, and possibly reports evidence to the authority. Finally, the authority designs a sanctioning/leniency policy that deters corporate crime at the lowest possible cost. The authority designs its policy trying to both (i) exacerbate agency problems within non-compliant firms and (ii) alleviate agency problems within compliant firms. We find that depending on the authority's ability to punish the manager, the authority may wish to instigate a within-firm race to the courthouse. We also provide comparative statics, carry a welfare analysis and discuss policy implications.
Schlagwörter: 
corporate crime
white-collar crime
leniency
compliance
antitrust
JEL: 
K21
K42
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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