Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79174 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2002-15
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government’s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic-Models-of-the-Political-Process
fiscal federalism
Intergovernmental-Relations
rent-seeking
JEL: 
F22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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