Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79174
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2002,15
Abstract: 
Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government’s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism.
Subjects: 
Economic-Models-of-the-Political-Process
fiscal federalism
Intergovernmental-Relations
rent-seeking
JEL: 
F22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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