Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79170
Authors: 
Sigman, Hilary
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2002,28
Abstract: 
Under most U.S. environmental regulations, the federal government shares responsibility with the states by authorizing them to implement and enforce federal policies. Authorization provides states with considerable discretion over the effects of regulation and is perhaps the most significant decentralization in U.S. environmental policy. However, few studies address its role. To fill this gap, this paper explores the empirical determinants of authorization for water pollution and hazardous waste regulation. No single hypothesis strongly explains authorization, but I find some evidence that states authorize to increase the stringency of regulation. This evidence points to desirable effects of decentralization.
Subjects: 
Environmental policy
Federalism
Hazardous waste
Intergovernmental relations
Water pollution
JEL: 
H77
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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